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Safeguarding Development: Risk Reduction in U.S. 
Government Foreign Aid and Investment Facilitation 
Beyond the Current Patchwork 
By Naomi Roht-Arriaza* 
I. Introduction 
Despite the current administration’s professed antipathy to foreign aid, the 
United States is still the largest bilateral donor of foreign aid in the world, with a 
number of U.S. government agencies (such as the U.S. Agency for International 
Development, or “USAID”) working in more than 100 countries abroad.  In 
addition, the U.S. facilitates the investment of U.S.-based private capital in the 
developing world through institutions (such as the Overseas Private Investment 
Corporation, or “OPIC”) that promote public-private partnerships or provide 
export credit or credit guarantees, political risk insurance or direct or indirect 
financing. 
When foreign assistance is administered well, it can save lives, support 
equality, combat poverty, reduce out-migration and promote more democratic 
societies that can be partners for the United States.  Export promotion activities 
can create new jobs both at home and abroad, and are particularly useful for U.S. 
small businesses seeking new markets.  However, as things now stand, each of the 
over 20 U.S. agencies doing foreign aid or export promotion work responds to a 
varied and uncoordinated set of laws, guidelines and internal directives on how to 
screen and monitor, and how to ensure beneficiary consultation and participation, 
in relevant projects.  While financial standards, criteria and implementation are 
relatively standardized and subject to outside oversight, the same is not true of 
nonfinancial risks.  These risks—to the environment, land and property rights, 
labor, gender and other issues that can make the difference between community 
support and sabotage—are incorporated into project design in a haphazard fashion 
due in part to an inadequate and cumbersome patchwork of laws, regulations, and 
limited oversight.  As a result, too often development-related projects and 
initiatives create unintended negative impacts on the people and environment in 
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the places they work.  Those who have little economic or political power are often 
most severely affected, raising issues of environmental justice both within and 
across communities.  And too often, the community buy-in needed for long-term 
success is lacking, and objections to these impacts make projects fail. 
This article maps the laws, regulations, mandatory government-wide and 
agency-wide policies, guidance and other practices regarding environmental and 
social safeguards of U.S. agencies concerned with foreign aid and export 
facilitation (as well as, where appropriate, their component bureaus, offices or 
programs).  Doing so turned out to be harder than it looked.  Some federal 
regulations, Executive Orders, or government-wide policy directives are clearly 
mandatory, but the language is at a high level of generality, making it difficult to 
translate into project-specific or programmatic imperatives.  Other agency policies 
are not clearly framed as either mandatory or best practice, but seem to straddle the 
line.  Finally, within a large bureaucracy such as USAID, different bureaus 
working in different sectors and regions have somewhat different emphases and 
policies, so that looking at the Agency as a whole only captures part of the picture.  
On the other hand, some agencies are only peripherally engaged in work outside 
the United States, typically through interagency initiatives such as Power Africa, 
and their domestic constraints and policies do not apply to overseas work.  There 
is little written guidance on how these agencies should operate abroad and they 
tend to work in multiagency coalitions where they defer to others with respect to 
these issues.  And finally, some of the big players in development-related spending, 
like the Defense and Agriculture departments, have different timelines, budgetary 
authorities and imperatives, making it difficult to compare across the board.  For 
simplicity, this article focuses on a limited number of core agencies. 
The resulting map is a snapshot in time, in a terrain that is shifting.  The 
Trump administration’s antipathy to foreign assistance overall presents new 
challenges, but also an opportunity.  Congress and the agencies themselves can 
take advantage of debates over the proper scope and goals of such assistance to 
refine procedures and rethink priorities, including strengthening safeguards and 
social accountability.  Existing authorities may be changed, harmonized or 
supplemented.  Indeed, in February 2018 a bipartisan group of Senators introduced 
a bill to consolidate OPIC and the USAID’s Development Credit Authority, 
USAID’s Enterprise Funds, and USAID’s Office of Private Capital and 
Microenterprise into a single International Development Finance Corporation, as 
discussed below.  Whatever the substance of the policies adopted, they begin from 
a basis of broadly expressed support for the idea that they should be 
environmentally and socially sound in order to be fiscally responsible and 
effective.   The current approach runs unnecessary risks of harming the very people 
our assistance and facilitation are supposed to help. 
Part II of this article defines social and environmental safeguards and briefly 
traces their history and functions.  Part III explores a number of recent trends that 
make safeguards more important and timely in U.S. government overseas 
activities.  Part IV explains the methodology and the lessons and findings on what 
currently exists, while Part V pinpoints some possible next steps, even in a difficult 
political environment.  
 
  




II. What are Social and Environmental Safeguards? 
Development banks and bilateral and multilateral foreign assistance agencies 
share the same goals: Reduce poverty, promote inclusion and advance sustainable 
development.  Other actors, while they lack an explicit development mandate, aim 
to promote responsible business and enhance the reputation of their governments.  
Many projects and programs financed by these agencies through grants or loans to 
governments or private actors actually improve lives. 
However, more frequently than they should, ill-conceived, precipitous or 
inadequately consulted projects and programs can cause unanticipated harms that 
are antithetical to the expressed goals of the project or initiative, including forced 
displacement, loss of livelihoods, harm to water or biodiversity, violence against 
women and children, use of child or forced labor, discrimination against minorities 
or political opponents, or even security force repression.  For example, a project 
might increase average incomes, yet have devastating effects on the poorest, who 
tend to be women or minorities.  Or despite understanding the environmental, 
social and human rights risks, a private or public-sector actor might think the 
potential private benefits, especially the financial returns, outweigh those public 
risks.  Or, even a project with net benefits for communities may be doomed by 
inadequate consultation, benefit-sharing and access to information.  The failure to 
recognize, address and course-correct for these harms early on can lead, at a 
minimum, to delays, project cancellations, precipitous withdrawal of funding and 
ultimately mission failure, and a souring of relationships between funding agencies 
and civil society when initiatives meant to promote development ultimately create 
or exacerbate human rights or environmental violations. 
“Safeguards” is the term used to describe the due diligence and resulting 
avoidance, minimization, mitigation and monitoring activities that public or private 
actors set up to avoid these problems.  An accountability regime complements 
safeguards by providing affected populations access to a remedy if, despite best 
efforts, something goes wrong.  A strong safeguard and accountability system can 
help avoid truly bad projects and programs that should be stopped or thoroughly 
changed, and can improve those projects that have a net social benefit but also 
unavoidable harms that need to be mitigated or compensated.  From the perspective 
of affected communities, they can avoid a slide into destitution, social 
disintegration, out-migration and violence.  From the perspective of the financers 
and donors, they can avoid harms to reputation and wasted resources, and allow 
for timely course corrections.1 
 
1. Safeguards are different from aid conditionalities, which are based on the 
imposition of the lender’s preferences regarding macroeconomic policy.  Conditionality has 
generally been imposed on a government or program-wide basis; safeguards, in contrast, 
generally apply more narrowly, to projects or discrete programs.  They are moreover based 
on international human rights, labor or environmental legal commitments that most 
governments have accepted.  Safeguards are also not the same as policies.  For example, a 
gender empowerment policy would support girls’ and women’s health, land rights or 
education, while a gender empowerment safeguard would ensure that another kind of 
  




The concept of safeguards originated with the multilateral development 
banks like the World Bank.  The World Bank established safeguards because 
public pressure around problematic projects led to an effort to avoid negative 
impacts, especially on the environment, forced displacement and the treatment of 
indigenous peoples.2  The World Bank’s International Finance Corporation, which 
focuses on the private sector, developed Performance Standards that turned out to 
be particularly influential and have been adopted broadly by a number of other 
entities.3  The World Bank created an accountability mechanism called the 
Inspection Panel to investigate and report on violations of the safeguards, and other 
banks, credit agencies and others added their own accountability mechanisms.4  
The U.S. continues to be a strong supporter of safeguards and accountability at 
international development banks. 
It turned out that not only development banks needed safeguards.  Export 
credit agencies, under the aegis of the Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development’s Common Principles, developed their own versions.5  
Multilateral donors such as the UN Development Program (“UNDP”) did so as 
 
project (for example infrastructure or income generation) did not exacerbate intrafamily 
violence or systematically impoverish women. 
2. Dana Clark, Jonathan Fox & Kay Treakle, DEMANDING ACCOUNTABILITY: CIVIL 
SOCIETY CLAIMS AND THE WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL, (Dana Clark et al. eds. 2003) 
https://jonathanfoxucsc.files.wordpress.com/2011/11/demandingaccountability.pdf [https:/ 
/perma.cc/Y3WC-B4YV].  For a description of the existing safeguards see WORLD BANK, 
REVIEW AND UPDATE OF THE WORLD BANK’S SAFEGUARD POLICIES: ENVIRONMENTAL AND 
SOCIAL FRAMEWORK (2016), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/7484514691074 
42841/pdf/107175-BR-R2016-0145-IDA-R2016-0198-Box396279B-PUBLIC.pdf [https:/ 
/perma.cc/5V8U-UXR3].  As of August 2016 the Bank approved a new Environmental and 
Social Framework, which will be rolled out over the next 18 months.  See https://consult 
ations.worldbank.org/consultation/review-and-update-world-bank-safeguard-policies. [http 
s://perma.cc/MC2G-44YX]. 
3. The eight IFC Performance Standards and commentary are available at 
http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/c8f524004a73daeca09afdf998895a12/IFC_Performa
nce_Standards.pdf?MOD=AJPERES. [https://perma.cc/K2VZ-HMZH]. 
4. The Panel may only investigate projects financed by the public sector branches of 
the World Bank Group.  In 1999, the World Bank Group established the Office of the 
Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman (“CAO”) to address complaints relating to private sector 
lending through the IFC and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA).  For 
more on the World Bank Inspection Panel, see http://ewebapps.worldbank.org/apps/ip/Pa 
ges/Home.aspx [https://perma.cc/NRG 7-V27X], and see Jonathan A. Fox, The World Bank 
Inspection Panel: Lessons from the First Five Years, 6 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 279 ( 2000).  
For a discussion of various accountability mechanisms, see GLASS HALF FULL? THE STATE 
OF ACCOUNTABILITY IN DEVELOPMENT FINANCE (2016), https://www.grievancemechanism 
s.org/resources/brochures/IAM_DEF_WEB.pdf/view [https://perma.cc/CU 7F-CJJC]. 
5. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Recommendation of 
the Council on Common Approaches for Officially Supported Export Credits and 








well6, as did the German, Dutch and Japanese development cooperation agencies.7  
Brazilian and Chinese development finance, an increasing source of funds for 
Africa, Asia and Latin America, have found it necessary to develop safeguards in 
order to work with existing public finance sources.8  And large corporations 
investing abroad have been putting their own due diligence protocols into practice.  
These include the U.N. Principles on Business and Human Rights (“Ruggie 
Principles”), the Equator Principles for banks, the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (“OECD”) principles on Multinational Enterprises and 
on Land Acquisition, and many sector- and issue-specific protocols.9 
 
6.  UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
STANDARDS (2015), http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/operations1/ 
undp-social-and-environmental-standards [https://perma.cc/27QA-RXW3]. UNDP has also 
established a Social and Environmental Compliance Unit (“SECU”), within the Office of 
Audit and Investigations (“OAI”) that accepts requests by communities to investigate 
alleged violations of UNDP’s social and environmental commitments.  Like other similar 
accountability mechanisms, alongside the compliance unit is a Stakeholder Response 
Mechanism that will attempt to facilitate dispute resolution at the country or regional office 
level for social and environmental issues related to a UNDP Project.  See SOCIAL AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE REVIEW AND STAKEHOLDER RESPONSE MECHANISM, 
http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/operations/accountability/secu-srm.html [https 
://perma.cc/SE8L-P5FK].  
7. For Japan’s safeguards and accountability regime, see JAPAN INTERNATIONAL 
COOPERATION AGENCY, GUIDELINES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL CONSIDERATIONS 
(April 2010), http://www.jica.go.jp/english/our_work/social_environmental/guideline/ 
pdf/guideline1; Japan International Cooperation Agency, Annual Report of the Examiners, 
Environmental and Social Considerations (2010), https://www.jica.go.jp/english/our_ 
work/social_environmental/objection/pdf/report2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/BZ 8A-X8K7].  
For Germany’s approach to human rights risks, see https://www.giz.de/fachexpertise/ 
downloads/Human_Rights_in_German_Development_Policy.pdf.  In 2015, the German 
Deutsche Entwicklungsgesellschaft (“DEG”) and its Dutch counterpart, the FMO 
Development Bank, set up a joint complaints/grievance mechanism.  See KFW-German 
Deutsche Entwicklungsgesellschaft, Complaint Mechanism, https://www.deginvest.de/Inte 
rnational-financing/DEG/Über-uns/Verantwortung/Beschwerdemanagement/ [https://perm 
a.cc/VC8L-RWPV]. 
8. FRIENDS OF THE EARTH UNITED STATES, CHINA DEVELOPMENT BANK AND CHINA 
EXPORT-IMPORT BANK (2016), http://webivadownton.s3.amazonaws.com/877/00/5/7 
226/2/emerging-sustainability-frameworks-CDB-ChinaExim.pdf, p. 22 [https://perma.cc/ 
Q7K4-2QVZ]; FRIENDS OF THE EARTH UNITED STATES, THE BRAZILIAN NATIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT BANK (2016), https://1bps6437gg8c169i0y1drtgz-wpengine.netdna-ssl. 
com/wp-content/uploads/wpallimport/files/archive/emerging-sustainability-frameworks-
BNDES.pdf [https://perma.cc/U8VQ95 X5].  The new Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank 
announced an Environmental and Social Framework in 2016, and has agreed to use other 
banks’ safeguards in joint projects.  Emma Rumney, Asian Infrastructure Development 
Bank strikes Co-operation Deal with World Bank, Public Finance International (Apr. 14, 
2016), http://www.publicfinanceinternational.org/news/2016/04/asian-infrastructure-invest 
ment-bank-strikes-co-operation-deal-world-bank [https://perma.cc/2 WMV-QWPX]. 
9. The U.N. Guiding Principles were developed in the context of the U.N. Human 
Rights Council’s special procedures, and constitute widely accepted “soft law.”  The U.N. 
has since created an ongoing Working Group on the implementation of the Principles.  
UNITED NATIONS OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER, GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON BUSINESS 
  





III. Why Are Safeguards Important Now? 
In the United States, the development and implementation of safeguards and 
accountability mechanisms has been uneven until now.  As detailed below, the U.S. 
leads in some areas, but lags in others.  Recognition of the importance of safeguards 
is growing.  The U.S. Congress has stated its support for safeguards and 
accountability principles at the international financial institutions, and its 
opposition to any dilution of them,10 in the December 2014 Appropriations Act.11  
It would stand to reason that Congress, in its oversight capacity, would want the 
same type of safeguards with respect to U.S. bilateral investments in development. 
The most important reason to seek robust safeguards and accountability is 
that they lead to better outcomes, or at least avoid truly bad ones.  But a number of 
changes in lending and aid patterns also suggest a need for increased attention to 
the subject.   
A. Changing patterns of investment and emerging standards 
regimes 
First, aid flows are increasing in sectors such as infrastructure and energy 
that are particularly vulnerable to unintended negative consequences.  The 
percentage of U.S. assistance funds going to finance infrastructure, natural 
resources-related, and energy-related projects has increased, and is expected to 
continue growing, although the mix of energy sources or conservation programs 
 
AND HUMAN RIGHTS: IMPLEMENTING THE UNITED NATIONS “PROTECT, RESPECT, AND 
REMEDY” FRAMEWORK (2011), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrin 
ciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/5SRS-KG42].  For more information on the 
Guiding Principles, see BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS RESOURCE CENTER, U.N. GUIDING 
PRINCIPLES, https://business-humanrights.org/en/un-guiding-principles [https://perma.cc/F5 
AL-4B9P].  The Equator Principles commit subscribing banks to basic environmental, social 
and human rights standards and information disclosure regarding their lending practices.  
Equator–subscribed Banks account for roughly 70% of all bank lending.  EQUATOR 
PRINCIPLES, ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL RISK MANAGEMENT FOR PROJECTS, 
http://equator-principles.com./wp-content/uploads/2017/03/equator_principles_III.pdf [htt 
ps://p erma.cc/8M34-AVBZ]. 
10. U.S. Consolidated Appropriations Bill 2016, Sec. 7029, reads: “(e) The Secretary 
of the Treasury shall instruct the United States executive director of each international 
financial institution to seek to ensure that each such institution responds to the findings and 
recommendations of its accountability mechanisms by providing just compensation or other 
appropriate redress to individuals and communities that suffer violations of human rights, 
including forced displacement, resulting from any loan, grant, strategy or policy of such 
institution.”  Congress also expressed concern regarding deficient safeguards, instructed the 
U.S. Treasury Department to require that MDBs conduct “rigorous human rights due 
diligence and risk management, as appropriate, in connection with any loan, grant, policy 
or strategy.”  Id. at 1254–56; and prohibited spending on extractive activities, including 
logging, in primary tropical forests (Id. at 1407). 
11. There is no indication in subsequent Appropriations Acts that Congress has 
changed its mind. 
  




may change.  Among all OECD countries, foreign aid for the energy sector almost 
doubled from 2008 to 2014.12  Agriculture, forests and fisheries spending grew 
approximately 50% during the same period.13  In the U.S. foreign aid budget, both 
agriculture and natural resources or environment-related spending have increased 
significantly in the last decade.14 These sectors tend to be among the most 
problematic with respect to unintended negative consequences in both the 
environmental and social arenas, and require more intensive consultation and work 
with affected groups.  
Second, more foreign assistance initiatives are carried out through multi-
donor or multiagency collaborations.  Much of our foreign assistance in these new 
focus sectors will be channeled through multi-donor or multiagency collaborations, 
including an increasing number that require safeguards policies of their partners.  
This may include intra-US government collaborations, partnerships with other 
bilateral agencies, with multilateral organizations or with the private sector.  A 
good example is the U.S. Power Africa initiative, which involves twelve federal 
agencies, working in conjunction with other states, multilateral banks and private 
partners.  While in the short term the U.S. may pull back from some of these 
collaborations, over a longer period this is increasingly the shape of foreign 
assistance from OECD countries.  As development cooperation agencies in other 
donor states create and implement their own safeguard and accountability 
mechanisms, the U.S. risks looking like a laggard, despite the fact that some U.S. 
agencies have been early adopters of a safeguards regime (for example, Ex-Im 
Bank was the first export credit agency to develop an environmental safeguards 
protocol).  The uneven nature of U.S. government safeguards creates increasing 
reputational risk as well as policy incoherence and confusion regarding which 
standards apply for interagency collaborations.  
 




14. According to a recent CRS study, “Agriculture programs saw significant 
decreases from the 1970s and 1980s, when they represented the bulk of U.S. development 
assistance.  In FY1984, agriculture and rural development received an appropriation of $725 
million from the development assistance account, compared to $315 million in FY1998 and 
$474 million in FY2008 from all USAID/State accounts. Agriculture-related programs were 
expected to receive about $1.6 billion in FY2015 … According to a recent CRS study, 
“Agriculture programs saw significant decreases from the 1970s and 1980s, when they 
represented the bulk of U.S. development assistance.  In FY1984, agriculture and rural 
development received an appropriation of $725 million from the development assistance 
account, compared to $315 million in FY1998 and $474 million in FY2008 from all 
USAID/State accounts. Agriculture-related programs were expected to receive about $1.6 
billion in FY2015.  Programs managing natural resources and protecting the global 
environment fell from $504 million in FY2002 to $324 million in FY2008.  Environmental 
programs received $733million in FY2010, more than doubling in just two years.  In 
FY2014, they were expected to receive about $820 million.”  Curt Tarnoff & Marian L. 
Lawson, Congressional Research Service, Foreign Aid: An Introduction to US Programs 
and Policy 12–13 (2016). 
  




Similarly, on the private sector side, business partners or implementers of 
U.S. agencies involved in overseas assistance are increasingly implementing their 
own due diligence procedures, as discussed above.  U.S. development cooperation 
is increasingly incorporating public-private partnerships of various sorts, with 
private partners implementing their own due diligence procedures or participating 
in industry or sector-specific codes.  How those mesh with public agency 
obligations is unclear and confusing for all concerned.  Examples include USAID’s 
work with Power Africa, and the New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition.   
B. Power Africa: wave of the future? 
The Power Africa Initiative exemplifies many of these trends.  The initiative 
aims to double the number of people in Sub-Saharan Africa who have access to 
electricity.  It involves USAID, Millennium Challenge Corporation (“MCC”), 
OPIC, Ex-Im, and six other U.S. government agencies along with the World Bank, 
the European Union, other bilateral donors and private investors.15  The agencies 
provide transaction support, financing, advice on legal and regulatory reform, legal 
assistance, capacity building and convening power to create partnerships around 
specific electrification projects to be built with private money.  Inadequate 
community support and lack of clarity around land rights and local participation 
have hobbled or killed some projects, while others have had to be revamped to 
improve local buy-in, adding to the time and expenses involved.16  While many 
Power Africa-supported projects have financing from multilateral or bilateral 
donors with (better or worse) safeguards, some of the privately financed projects 
do not, creating a gap.  There is also an assumption by Power Africa’s implementer 
that where another donor with an existing safeguards protocol exists, there is no 
need for independent analysis and the other donor will do a good job—an  
assumption not always borne out, especially in the case of multilateral donors.  
Power Africa is also different because the agencies involved largely facilitate and 
accelerate private investment, rather than funding or building facilities.   
Within Power Africa, recent complaints and setbacks have led to an effort to 
focus on improving community engagement on a case-by-case basis, using NGO 
 
15. USAID POWER AFRICA ANNUAL REPORT, https://www.usaid.gov/power 
africa/annualreport [https://perma.cc/YA9H-WBWB]. (last visited Mar. 11, 2018).  
16. First there was the US$148 million Kinangop wind project in Kenya that was 
supposed to create the area’s first private wind farm, with Norwegian investors and General 
Electric turbines and financial facilitation by USAID and the U.S. Overseas Private 
Investment Corporation. The only problem was that local people did not want to be 
displaced from their homes and had no idea whether there would be energy benefits for 
them; no one spent much time talking to them about how the project was going to work or 
asking about their desires.  So they protested and delayed and this eventually raised the costs 
to the point that the private investors pulled out.  Then a team of investigators found that 
local Masaai tribesmen were similarly unhappy about a geothermal project in the region, 
also supported by Power Africa.  Agencies scrambled to respond to allegations of lack of 
consultation, land rights and displacement issues, resulting in some changes. USAID, 
POWER AFRICA 2015 REPORT. P. 28, http://energyaccess.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08 
/Power-Africa-Annual-Report-FULL-REPORT.pdf [https://perma.cc/N8Q7-3Y2S].  
  




or other third party intermediaries.  A 2016 report by the Power Africa Transactions 
and Reforms Program (“PATRP”), a USAID implementer for Power Africa, 
identified environmental and gender equity objectives that have been put in place 
to fill in the gap created where no other agency is involved in a project.17  
According to the report, in initiatives involving late-stage transaction support or 
small-scale electrification (mini-grid) projects, a desktop review (that is, not 
including a site visit) of the project must consider environmental and social 
impacts, including site-specific and country conditions.  Among the issues to be 
considered are displacement and relocation of population, land tenure status, 
biological and emissions impacts, and social/cultural/political/economic 
considerations, including the risk of investing in the country at all.  As of the date 
of the report, 26 out of 65 transactions had been subject to screening—the rest 
either had another agency involved, or were at a preliminary stage.  Of those 
screened, it seems that environmental impact reports are required, but are done 
according to national standards, which may be less stringent than international best 
practice.  Moreover, several ESIAs are missing, but will be required as the projects 
move forward.  Training and dissemination activities are included in future plans.  
The implementer also recently hired a Gender Advisor, who has created a strategy 
and activities for including gender considerations in future Power Africa projects.  
While these are positive steps, the reactive and late-in-the-game manner of their 
execution call for doing better in the future. 
 
IV. Methodology and Initial Findings 
The primary focus of the study mapping US safeguard policies was on the 
following five thematic areas:  
 
1. Environmental issues, specifically the requirements and scope of 
environmental impact assessment, with special attention to energy, 
forests and biodiversity;   
2. Land and natural resources as they affect communities, including forced 
physical and economic displacement as a result of development projects 
or activities;  
3. Non-discrimination and protection of vulnerable groups, particularly 
specific policies vis-à-vis gender, indigenous peoples, LGBTI people, 
disabled persons or other disadvantaged groups;   
4. Community health and safety, including issues around security and 
exacerbation of inter- and intra-community conflict; and 
5. Labor rights, including freedom of association, working conditions, 
child and forced labor and wages/hours.   
 
 
17. USAID, POWER AFRICA TRANSACTIONS AND REFORMS PROGRAM, SECOND 
ANNUAL REPORT (2015), http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pa00kvgr.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
2ZF2-E8MU]. 
  




In addition to thematic areas, it also looked where available at three 
procedural issues: 
 
1. Participation and consultation with affected communities or 
populations; 
2. Transparency and access to information about policies and projects for 
interested parties, and  
3. Access to redress for affected populations in case a problem arises.   
 
The initial subset of agencies includes those that are primarily charged with 
the development, investment and export promotion activities of the U.S. 
government.  These include USAID, MCC, OPIC, and Ex-Im Bank.  They also 
included a less intensive degree of scrutiny of a number of other agencies, reflected 
in the narrative but not in the chart.  The study used the publicly available 
documents of each agency, “not for attribution” in person and telephone interviews 
with staff from various agencies during April, May, and June of 2016, with limited 
updates in 2017.  Some interviewees were gracious enough to provide further 
internal documents. 
From this material came a chart, cowritten with Alexandra Avram and 
reproduced in Annex I, comparing the mandatory policy and guidelines on a range 
of environmental and social issues across agencies.  In creating the chart, we tried 
to differentiate between “hard” binding law, internal policies, and guidelines or 
best practices that are not binding, but inform agency practice.  We color coded the 
chart accordingly: red for statutes, Executive Orders, federal regulations, treaties 
and other similar legal documents; orange for mandatory agency policies; and 
green for less clearly mandatory policies and guidance.  In practice the line proved 
blurry and, as our interviewees indicated, the intent and the implementation of a 
policy did not always coincide.  Nonetheless, with those caveats, the color scheme 
may prove useful in quickly understanding the strength as well as the extent of the 
existing safeguard obligations within a given agency or bureau.  The study 
produced three overarching observations. 
 Three overarching observations 
1. Inconsistency is the constant. 
 
There is massive inconsistency in terms of the U.S. government safeguard 
regime at every level—between agencies and departments, between thematic areas 
and between levels of enforcement and/or implementation.  Some have elaborate 
social and environmental safeguards and accountability systems.  Others have only 
a handful of mandatory policies, supplemented by myriad guidelines and policy 
documents with little clarity about how they are to be implemented and how 
implementation is to be assessed. Agencies that do not think of themselves 
primarily as programmatic or project-focused tend to have limited or undeveloped 
safeguards or risk management.  The Department of State, for example, has 
elaborate program design and evaluation guidelines, but they are focused on 
  




intended outcomes, not on unanticipated risks.18  Agencies with a mostly domestic 
mandate have few rules about overseas work and tend to rely on State Department 
guidance.  Small foundations like the U.S. Africa Development Foundation are 
similarly not designed or staffed to have more than minimal environmental 
guidance, and depend on program officers to evaluate other non-financial risks on 
a case-by-case basis.  Other agencies, for example the MCC, work with a limited 
subset of countries that meet minimal benchmarks on governance as a way of 
reducing risks.19 
Environmental and gender-related issues are the subject of more detailed 
requirements and expectations than other issues.  Environmental impact 
assessment is almost universally required, but environmental impacts only extend 
to social issues like displacement or cultural heritage if tied to effects on the 
environment.  USAID, for instance, is required by federal regulation to implement 
environmental assessment and has placed environmental officers in missions as 
well as at headquarters to do so. 
Gender analysis is required by USAID’s internal rules (the Automated 
Directives System or ADS), and over time, through mandatory training and 
mandatory and suggested guidance, the incorporation of gender-related concerns 
to programming has improved.  The MCC also has a well-developed set of gender 
analysis rules, while other agencies have very little spelled out.  On the other hand, 
there are several key areas that are less developed across the board: human rights; 
conflict/atrocity prevention and mitigation; community land, resources, and 
health/safety; and rules regarding participation and consultation with 
communities—most notably indigenous peoples.  Defining concerns explicitly in 
human rights terms, rather than the language of social issues, is particularly 
problematic, and some agencies have relied instead on consultation with the State 
Department’s Human Rights Bureau.  OPIC, alone among the agencies studied, 
pays close attention to labor rights and impacts of investment on U.S. and overseas 
workers, including through a formal multiagency review of country eligibility for 
trade benefits due to concerns on workers’ rights and a consultative review of 
specific projects. 
There is also little uniformity in how the same safeguards language is 
implemented in practice.  For example, Ex-Im Bank, OPIC, and MCC all reference 
the IFC performance standard on environmental impact assessment (“EIA”).  
USAID uses its own mandatory regulation.20  However, in practice some agencies 
rely solely on project proponents (governments, implementers, or private 
investors) to carry out and certify the EIA, while others hire consultants to review 
the process and the resulting plan, and still others use their own staff to carry out 
site visits, desk reviews and consultations with local groups on the quality and 
content of the EIA and the resultant action plan.  Some agencies have explicit lists 
 
18. See, e.g. U.S. Department of State and USAID, Joint Strategic Plan FY 2018-
2022 (Feb. 2018), https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/277156.pdf [https://per 
ma.cc/HEW9-Y6MZ]. 
19. Millennium Challenge Act of 2003, as amended, 22 U.S.C. 7701, et seq. 
20. 22 C.F.R. § 216 (2018). 
  




of excluded project types; most have some trigger of extra scrutiny (“category A,” 
for example) while a few have a much vaguer cost-benefit analysis. 
In some cases, U.S. agencies have been able to influence and lead 
international safeguard development.  For example, the early work at Ex-Im Bank 
on environmental safeguards became the basis for the OECD Common 
Approaches used by all OECD export credit agencies.  A group of basic safeguards 
have been borrowed by U.S. agencies from other contexts.  These include the IFC 
Performance Standards, the Equator Principles designed for private banks, the 
World Bank’s Health and Safety standards, and rules regarding private security 
contractors or construction projects borrowed from private standard-setting groups.  
This facilitates adoption, cuts down on the time involved, and allows for some 
cross-agency collaboration and comparisons, but it also means that in some 
contexts additional tailoring is needed. 
Even where agencies use the same externally generated safeguards, like the 
IFC Performance Standards, they never use them as stand-alones but paired with 
additional, and varied, supplementary standards.  For example, the IFC standards 
are particularly weak on labor, gender and human rights issues, so OPIC pairs them 
with labor standards generated from U.S. law (“special consideration” countries) 
and the Millennium Challenge Corporation supplements with its own gender and 
women’s empowerment standards.  This leads to inconsistencies among U.S. 
agencies.  
 
2. Creating a holistic, robust U.S. safeguards regime is feasible, but 
requires significant political will and staff buy-in at headquarters 
and in the field.  
 
Existing safeguards exist largely because of Congressional directives and 
Executive Orders that have defined many of the issues that agencies consider in 
project assessment and planning.  While Congress has regularly stepped in to 
strengthen safeguards, action has come about largely in relation to scandals or to 
specific member concerns, and thus has been inconsistent and uneven.  Further 
specification and rigor in safeguards development has also come about as a result 
of General Accountability Organization (“GAO”) or USAID Inspector General 
investigations, or because of civil society pressure (including media attention) 
arising from agency support for an egregiously bad project. 
Safeguards and standards, to be effective, must be combined with adequate 
staffing, training, incentives for application, and monitoring and revision.  For 
example, environmental and gender issues in USAID and MCC are incorporated 
through the use of a Compliance Officer or Point of Contact in each Mission, MCA 
and/or Bureau, whose job it is to revise and oversee adequate consideration of 
environmental and gender issues by project proponents (public or private).  USAID 
Environmental Compliance officers have the authority to require changes, or even 
to stop, a project or program even if it has been approved by Mission leadership.  
The gender-related rules are implemented in part through mandatory training 
(including simulations and role-plays) of all new officers.  These best practices, 
however, do not extend to other issues.  Even where a stated policy is in place, it 
is largely programmatic (i.e., we will support work on this issue) rather than aimed 
  




at checking for unanticipated impacts.  In USAID, the production of a raft of new 
policies, aimed at redressing the Agency’s loss of policy autonomy for a period in 
the early and mid-2000s, led to “policy fatigue” in recent years.  This made it more 
difficult to develop and implement new safeguard policies, and led to a search for 
alternative mechanisms that might create changes even without a policy.  For 
example, an indigenous peoples’ policy has been drafted and, as of 2017, had been 
awaiting approval by USAID’s leadership for several years. 
In interviews, agency staff members agreed that avoiding environmental and 
social harm from development projects would be a good thing.21  However, they 
worried about adding extra time and complexity to already cumbersome 
procedures.22  It is true that good analysis takes time.  Indeed, assessments and 
management plan revisions are meant to take time, to provide a speed bump that 
counters the natural inclinations of funders and financers to move money out the 
door as quickly as possible and allow time for reflection and consultation.  In a 
time of strained budgets and attacks on foreign aid as a luxury item, objections are 
understandable.  However, the whole point of safeguards is to make final projects 
better, easier to implement and more sustainable, and to minimize the kinds of 
expensive, harmful boondoggles that give development cooperation a bad name.  
By spending time and money up front, agencies avoid spending even more down 
the line. 
A subtler, and more cogent, objection is that safeguards in an institutional 
setting where the incentives are misaligned will simply result in box-checking and 
lip service, rather than change in institutional culture.  For example, contractors are 
required to check a box stating that, to their knowledge, they do not employ victims 
of human trafficking.  While intended to act as a trigger for internal investigations 
of labor hiring, they may not do so, providing the appearance of change without 
the substance.  Some critiques of gender analysis in development project 
assessment similarly argue that project proponents simply “check the box,” for 
example stating that a road will be used by both men and women, and then calling 
that their “gender assessment.”23  Adding further safeguard policies will just 
exacerbate the existing encouragement of form over substance.  
There is merit to this objection if safeguards are considered as a stand-alone.  
There is an extensive literature on auditing, especially environmental and social 
auditing in the private sector, that can shed light on the problem of institutional 
cultures and “buy-in.”24  While a full discussion is beyond the scope of this article, 
 
21. All of my interviewees expressed this position. 
22. This was especially true of interviewees who saw themselves in competition with 
other sources of credit or guarantees, or who faced pressure from Congress to “get money 
out the door quickly.”  Interviews, Washington D.C. (May 2016). 
23. Story recounted by a USAID employee, interview, (May 2016).  All agency 
employees interviewed for this article were promised nonattribution. 
24. See, e.g. Martina K. Linnenluecke & Andrew Griffiths, Corporate sustainability 
and organizational culture, 45 J. OF WORLD BUS. 4, 357–366 (2010); NEIL GUNNINGHAM, 
ROBERT A. KAGAN, & DOROTHY THORNTON, SHADES OF GREEN: BUSINESS, REGULATION, 
AND ENVIRONMENT (Stanford Univ. Press, 2003); ANDREW CRANE & DIRK MATTEN, 
  




a few lessons from that literature are pertinent.  Strong demonstrated support from 
the top of the organization, both stated, and in promotion and compensation 
policies is one key.  Adequate staffing and budgets for safeguard implementation 
is another.  “Mainstreaming” and practical training for all, along with additional 
training and authority for the relevant points of contact or compliance officers, is 
another concomitant of success.  Monitoring and oversight, including public access 
to assessments, plans and complaints and randomized third-party checks, is yet 
another.  But training and other “soft” techniques only work when there is a “hard” 
mandatory set of rules at the core as well as some mechanism for enforcement.  
Moreover, effective controls depend on “demand” as well as “supply.”  If affected 
people are unaware of their rights and of safeguard policies, their advocates and 
defenders are attacked and silenced, and there are few advocates willing or able to 
navigate complex safeguard regimes, even the best rules will end up as mere 
paperwork.  Rather, closed feedback loops that refer constantly back to impacted 
populations and use their feedback to improve seem to avoid the box-checking 
dynamic.  Safeguards will work best when integrated into a larger suite of support 
measures, but that is not a reason to reject them altogether.   
 
3. Very little attention is paid to remedying violations once they 
occur.   
 
Only OPIC has an Office of Accountability to problem-solve and, if needed, 
review compliance with standards if adversely affected communities complain.  
And OPIC has much more developed requirements than other agencies for 
consultation with “project affected peoples,” although even these fall short of the 
ongoing monitoring and feedback loops needed for projects once they have been 
approved.  For those agencies that rely on the International Finance Corporation’s 
Performance Standards, those standards rely on the client to establish project-level 
grievance procedures but create no obligations on the lending or donor agency.  In 
cases where government mainly facilitates and supports private investment (as in 
Power Africa), private parties are encouraged to create community engagement 
approaches that include ongoing monitoring and a local redress mechanism, but as 
a matter of “best practice” rather than regulatory or contractual obligation. 
 
V. Next Steps 
The current administration has proposed drastically reduced budgets and less 
support for foreign aid and investment promotion.25  No matter what one thinks of 
this strategy, it increases the need to use whatever funds are available in ways that 
 
BUSINESS ETHICS: MANAGING CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP AND SUSTAINABILITY IN THE ERA OF 
GLOBALIZATION, (Oxford Univ. Press, 2d ed., 2007). 
  
25. Bryant Harris, Robbie Gramer & Emily Tamkin, The End of Foreign Aid as We 








are likely to lead to the most beneficial results and to enhance the reputation of the 
U.S.  That means that, in an environment where less money and support may be 
available, those projects that do go forward should be fully supported by the 
intended beneficiaries, and not potentially the subject of adverse publicity, protests, 
delays or legal challenges.  Doing more with less requires that investments be as 
cost-effective as possible.  A robust set of safeguards is designed to ensure exactly 
that.  
The current political climate may make safeguard improvements a medium-
term endeavor.  However, a good portion of foreign assistance (including 
initiatives like Power Africa, discussed below) aims at bolstering private foreign 
investment and has bipartisan support.26  Assuming the current U.S. administration 
decides to maintain at least some foreign assistance, as is likely, a focus on 
reducing waste and misspending in both the White House and Congress might well 
converge with efforts by career officials to upgrade and harmonize environmental 
and social standards and accountability in foreign assistance and investment 
promotion.  If that happens, there are some practical questions that would need 
answers.   
A. More research is needed 
First, more research is required.  This article summarizes what agencies say 
they do, not necessarily what they actually do.  Some information exists on the 
procedures actually followed, for example to see if a consultation was done 
perfunctorily or seriously.  It would be useful to compile those procedures, but 
beyond that, much more research is needed on how safeguards have helped avoid 
or terminate bad projects, and improve others.  The research agenda also needs to 
expand to other agencies with large overseas footprints. 
One option would be to work first on a set of projects that combine many of 
the characteristics noted above—a focus on energy and land, multiagency, private-
public and large-scale—and use them as a living laboratory. The evolving efforts 
to better incorporate environmental and social considerations, including gender 
and human rights, in the Power Africa Initiative will provide important lessons for 
how to effectively and efficiently “harmonize up” to the highest standards.   
B. Imagining options and architectures will be challenging 
Beyond more research, the best way to move towards the most protective 
and robust set of safeguards is complex.  Should there be one uniform safeguard 
and accountability regime applicable to every agency that spends money or 
provides technical assistance abroad?  Or should each agency develop and monitor 
its own?  There are undeniable advantages to a single, uniform standard.  It would 
maximize a “whole of government” approach, and allow the U.S. to play a 
 
26. Todd Moss, What Does The Trump Administration Mean For Power Africa?, 








leadership role internationally.  It would allow for easier, government-wide 
training and would reduce the possibility of confusing or contradictory procedures.  
It would be able to combine the best practices of each agency in the issue areas 
where they are strongest (for example, the gender policies of USAID or MCC with 
the involuntary resettlement or labor rights safeguards of OPIC) and to ensure that 
all U.S. development cooperation or investment assistance complies with a single 
minimum standard, although agencies could choose to go further.  It would also 
allow for uniform application of a single set of safeguards and thus give some 
predictability and security for public and private implementers and partners, who 
would only have to learn a single set of rules no matter where the support came 
from.   
However, countervailing considerations counsel caution.  Agencies are very 
different in size, visibility and complexity, in some cases deliberately so.  The 
MCC, for example, was set up to be small, selective and nimble, unlike its bigger 
USAID cousin.  Some have an explicit development or poverty reduction mandate, 
while others are limited to export promotion or technical support.  Some rely more 
on implementers than others; the relationship with recipient governments also 
varies widely.  Some spend a small percentage of their budget on overseas projects, 
while for others that is all they do.  Imposing uniformity on this diversity might 
result in a uniform common denominator that is too much for some and too little 
for others.  For small agencies, the investment in time and energy might not 
produce the same positive results that it would in a larger, more bureaucratized 
setting.  Moreover, a government-wide set of standards would risk becoming a 
least-common-denominator mush, satisfying no one. 
Given these competing concerns, it might make sense to think about a core 
set of safeguards supplemented by agency-specific protocols.  That would allow 
for uniform training, materials, and a community of practice to emerge, without 
the straightjacket of total uniformity.  Any core set of safeguards would have to 
cover similar issue areas (presumably those discussed above), categorization of 
projects or investments according to the degree of risk, specifics on who carries 
out initial assessments, creation of management plans for avoidance of impacts and 
mitigation or compensation for unavoidable ones, monitoring, and review.  It 
would require directives on access to information, participation and consultation 
with affected communities (including specific rules on dealing with indigenous 
communities), and some way for those adversely affected to complain about 
projects or programs and trigger either consultations/mediation or an 
investigation—the two tasks that would be carried out by a grievance mechanism 
for U.S. agencies. 
Any of these options will require institutional architecture.  Should there be 
a single government safeguards watchdog or should this task be integrated into 
each existing agency?  Placing a safeguards unit within agencies creates tensions 
between project managers and those seen as delaying or second-guessing their 
work, potentially leading to weak or ignored safeguards.  Yet an outside agency 
might not have the intimate knowledge of an agency’s culture and procedures 
needed to be an effective advocate and monitor.  Creating new federal offices, 
moreover, is likely to be a Sisyphean task in the current political climate.  A 
coordinating body of people from the major aid, investment promotion, and trade 
  




agencies, with some support from the Department of State, might be a compromise 
between these two options.27  A variant would empower a single individual or 
office, housed in a single agency, to exercise government-wide primacy in 
discussions over a given issue.  That is the route taken on indigenous peoples’ 
issues, where a single officer, housed at USAID, promotes policies that apply to 
all overseas public spending or support.28  
The accountability function raises an additional set of concerns.  OPIC, 
which has the most developed complaint function (including both a mediation and 
an investigation arm) has complained that its Office of Accountability has been 
underused.  While better publicity about the Office’s existence and legal support 
for communities affected by projects would certainly help, the issue of 
underutilization of resources is real.29  It would be possible to combine such 
offices, or to designate a single existing government agency as the appropriate 
forum, recognizing that issues of disparate agency culture, turf wars, competition 
for resources and other ills of bureaucratic life would no doubt complicate efforts 
to designate a “lead agency.”  However, if the Dutch and German aid agency 
accountability functions were successfully combined into a single office, perhaps 
there is hope for meshing the different cultures of offices within the US 
government. 
Another option might be to expand the purview of the existing Inspector 
Generals’ Offices.  Each major U.S. department or agency has an Inspector General 
who promotes economy, efficiency, and effectiveness and roots out fraud, waste, 
and abuse.30  These auditors follow uniform protocols and are governed by a 
Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, an Executive Branch 
body.  The State Department, USAID and the Department of Defense, among 
others, have Inspector Generals, as do almost 70 other federal agencies.  These 
bodies, or the Council of IGs, could broaden their mandate to consider 
environmental and social considerations as part of effectiveness and efficiency.  
Indeed, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria houses its 
 
27. There are precedents: the Clinton administration created an Interagency Working 
Group on Human Rights Treaties, headed by National Security Council staff, to coordinate 
agency implementation of U.S. human rights treaty obligations. Exec. Order No. 13107, 63 
FR 68991, § 4 (1998), available at https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/WCPD-1998-12-14/p 
df/WCPD-1998-12-14-Pg2459.pdf [https://perma.cc/VC2T-WTCT].  That administration 
also created the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), in part to ensure a 
prospective look at the costs and benefits of regulation. Exec. Order No. 12866, 58 FR 51735 
(1993).   
28. Interview with anonymous employee at USAID, Washington, D.C. (May 2016). 
29. OPIC operates on a self-sustaining basis, at no net cost to the taxpayers, so a 
drain on taxpayer resources is not the concern; best utilization of the agency’s resources is.  
See, OPIC, WHO ARE WE, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, https://www.opic.gov/who-we-
are/faqs [https://perma.cc/L3YN-5GL2] (last visited Mar. 11, 2018). 
30.  Inspector General Act of 1978, S. 1681, 113th Cong. (2014), available at 
https://www.ignet.gov/sites/default/files/files/igactasof1010(1).pdf [https://perma.cc/E9 
AA-BPRG].   
  




human rights complaint mechanism within its Inspector General’s Office.31  The 
USAID IG, for instance, already issues audit reports on projects that go far beyond 
waste and fraud to consider the overall achievements and shortcomings of projects, 
including the environmental and social ones.32  The IG also has whistle-blowing 
protections, ability to obtain documents, and security considerations built into its 
governing legislation.  On the other hand, if specific IG offices have a tumultuous 
or tense history with program staff, it might be best to start anew.  It is also unclear 
whether affected communities would have adequate access to IG offices, which are 
not set up for such access.  In the private sector, asking outside auditing firms to 
assume environmental and social audits has been a mixed bag.33  Moreover, 
housing safeguards in an IG’s office might put too much weight on the “do no 
harm” side of the equation, shortchanging efforts to use safeguards to improve 
projects rather than simply avoid disasters. 
C. The role of congressional reshaping 
No matter which path is chosen, Congress will have to play an active role in 
any reforms.  Congress can create problems for aid agencies by setting unrealistic 
timeframes, by designating specific priorities that are unconnected from—and 
sometimes contradictory to—overall assistance goals, and by inadequate and at 
times capricious budgeting practices.  But Congress has also expressed a clear 
interest in having U.S. taxpayer monies be well spent, while avoiding 
environmental and social harm.  It is in a position to require across-the-board 
guarantees that agencies are adequately scrutinizing their own projects, following 
best practice, and providing opportunities for redress when things go wrong. 
An important potential vehicle for doing so was introduced into the Senate 
in February 2018.  Senate Bill 2463 (the “BUILD Act”) would consolidate the 
operations of OPIC and the USAID’s Development Credit Authority, USAID’s 
Enterprise Funds, and USAID’s Office of Private Capital and Microenterprise into 
a single International Development Finance Corporation (IDFC).  The new entity 
would have a Chief Risk Officer to identify, assess, monitor and limit risks, as well 
as a risk committee of its Board.34 It would require an explicit tie of its investments 
to market-friendly development and to remedying market failures, and the creation 
 
31. Ibon Villelabeitia, The Global Fund Launches Human Rights Complaints 
Procedure, THE GLOBAL FUND, NEWS & STORIES (Apr. 27, 2015), http://www.theglo 
balfund.org/en/news/2015-0427_Global_Fund_Launches_Human_Rights_Complaints_Pr 
ocedure/ [https://perma.cc/75HT-Y3RT].  
32. See, e.g., the report on a Cambodian forestry project, available at https://oig.usai 
d.gov/sites/default/files/audit-reports/5-442-16-002-p.pdf [https://perma.cc/4YHB-BSQU], 
or on a Haitian agricultural project, available at https://oig.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/audit 
-reports/1-521-16-001-p.pdf [https://perma.cc/XW7M-5ZLG]. 
33. Dara O’Rourke, Outsourcing Regulation: Analyzing Nongovernmental Systems 
of Labor Standards and Monitoring, 31 POLICY STUDIES J. 1, 1–30 (2003) (a critical look at 
Ernst & Young monitoring for Nike in Vietnam).  
34. S. 2463, 115th Cong., §103(f) (2018).   
  




of a performance management system to evaluate outcomes.35  The current 
safeguard language is minimal, including a basic commitment to labor rights and 
environmental protection.36  It is not clear whether it would transfer the full corpus 
of OPIC and USAID safeguard and accountability policies to its successor.  Any 
further development of the legislation will need to ensure that current OPIC and 
USAID safeguard and accountability policies are not only adopted in full, but 
strengthened.  Well done, this could be an opportunity to move towards a more 
robust set of rules while modernizing.  Poorly done, it could be counterproductive. 
 
VI. Conclusion  
Many people within and without the U.S. government have realized that the 
current state of affairs is untenable.  The shape of those changes and their speed 
will in some measure be affected by the priorities of the administration, by the 
results of revised safeguards at the multilateral development banks and at U.S. 
allies’ aid agencies, and by the ability of people affected by problematic projects 
to make common cause with U.S.-based environmental, development and human 
rights organizations.  Especially in light of increasing worries that U.S. policy will 
favor unbridled resource extraction, these organizations might do well to pay more 
attention to using and improving safeguards and demanding greater accountability.  
More robust and effective safeguard and accountability policies will not, 
themselves, change the shape of international development, nor ensure 
environmental sustainability or human rights observance.  The continuing 
checkered history of projects financed by international financial institutions is 
proof of that.37  However, improving safeguards and accountability will, above all, 
 
35. Id. at §§ 201, 402. 
36. The bill would require the new entity to support projects in countries that are 
“taking steps to adopt and implement laws that extend internationally recognized worker 
rights to workers in that country,” and to  “not vote in favor of any project that is likely to 
have significant adverse environmental impacts that are sensitive, diverse or unprecedented” 
unless an environmental impact assessment, including consideration of alternatives, is 
completed and “made available to the U.S. public, locally affected groups in the country in 
which the project will be carried out, and nongovernmental organizations in that country.”  
Id. at §501(d)-(e). 
37. I would argue that the safeguard polices have not been applied well; report after 
report shows how the banks have ignored, violated, or watered down their own rules.  A 
new set of World Bank environmental and social safeguards leaves more discretion to 
borrowers.  See, World Bank, Environmental and Social Framework: Getting 
Environmental and Social Standards for Investment Project Financing (Aug. 4, 2016), 
available at: https://consultations.worldbank.org/Data/hub/files/consultation-template/ 
review-and-update-world-bank-safeguard-policies/en/materials/the_esf_clean_final_for_ 
public_disclosure_post_board_august_4.pdf [https://perma.cc/EW5B-N2M9].  A full 
discussion of the evolution of IFI safeguards and their shortcomings is beyond the scope of 
this article.  See, e.g., International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, Evicted and 
Abandoned:  The World Bank’s Broken Promise to the Poor (ICIJ, 2014) available at 
https://www.icij.org/ project/world-bank [https://perma.cc/RT8X-SEXW].  See also, World 
Bank Group, Internal Audit Vice Presidency, Advisory Review of the Bank’s Safeguard 
Risk Management (June 6, 2014 draft), available at http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/ 
  




allow people to have a voice and a choice in their own development.  It will take 
an inclusive, imaginative and politically savvy process, with both Congressional 
and Executive branch buy-in, to move forward, but it can and must be done in order 
to ensure that our foreign aid dollars are spent effectively, development goals are 
achieved, and human rights respected. 
 








[https://perma.cc/NPU6ZY8F] (internal audit of World Bank lending showed the Bank did 
not flag risky projects, had no way of tracking mitigation or monitoring requirements put in 
place as a result of safeguards implementation, and did not support or review the work of 
environmental or social safeguard specialists to make sure they were actually monitoring 
projects.  In response, Bank management pledged to do better.  See the websites of Bank 
Information Center (http://www.bankinformationcenter.org [https://perma.cc/5EAE-
E356]), Inclusive Development International (http://www.inclusivedevelopment.net 
[https://perma.cc/JB7F-GG47]), International Rivers Network (irn.org) [https://perma.cc/ 
W8N6-G8M4]) for examples of problematic projects. 
